This piece lays out concerns about the Democratic Socialists of America, documenting its praise for authoritarian figures, internal calls to undermine the Constitution, ties to communist caucuses, delegations to Cuba, and links to foreign influence efforts.
Boris Sanchez has written that he was born in Cuba and landed in Miami the day he turned three, and he told that story on his show when confronting DSA leadership. “Fidel Castro locked my grandfather up,” Sanchez said, “sentenced to 20 years for doing what you’re doing now on live TV, for speaking his mind.” Then Sanchez asked, “And Fidel Castro was a beacon of democracy?” The exchange set the tone for a deeper look at the group’s leaders and alliances.
The DSA’s national leadership answered defensively on broadcast television, with Ashik Siddique saying, “I wouldn’t say that,” and pointing to social gains in Cuba like expanded healthcare. That phrasing stands beside a far different record: the organization published a birthday tribute to Fidel Castro and sent dozens of members to Havana as guests of the Cuban government. Those gestures raise questions about where sympathies and priorities lie for a U.S.-based political group.
Inside the DSA, some members are blunt about their intent. A member of the national governing board said on a podcast, “So the two things that we’re famous for is our commitment to a program and our hatred of the United States Constitution.” The remark did not come from an offhand critic; it was offered as a clear description of a faction’s orientation toward radical change. Those words resonate with published materials that call for aggressive action against existing institutions.
One set of internal documents even recommends a confrontational posture toward the Constitution, explaining the sixth point of a platform as “Fight the Constitution” with a subhead that reads: “We want socialists to fight to overthrow the Constitution.” The material goes further: it champions “the right of the working class to take power by any means necessary” and warns that “the working class will need armed self-defense to protect itself from the inevitable violence of reaction.” That rhetoric imagines splitting the military by trying to “win a decisive section of the military rank and file over to our side.”
The DSA’s public face downplays communist labels, but multiple caucuses and factions within the organization acknowledge them openly. One faction calls itself “a multi-tendency communist caucus in the Democratic Socialists of America,” while another traces its politics “to the Bolshevik Tradition” and organizes “to overthrow the capitalist state.” A Leninist caucus identifies as “a Marxist-Leninist caucus in DSA” that “seeks to cohere a vanguard party,” language that echoes the classic vanguard model Lenin described.
At a recent national convention, delegates sang The Internationale and waved red banners while removing a previous ban on democratic centralism. Under democratic centralism, once the group settles a question, every member falls in line in public. Delegates approved the repeal by a large margin, signaling a willingness to enforce internal unity and discipline in service of collective decisions.
Leadership choices reflect these alignments. Both DSA co-chairs traveled to Havana as guests of Cuban state agencies, meeting with ICAP and Amistur and publicly thanking the hosts. Their hosts included figures with documented histories in intelligence operations; one, Fernando Gonzalez Llort, served fifteen years in a U.S. prison for spying as part of the Wasp Network. Subsequent U.S. sanctions targeted his agency and then him personally, tying the delegation to controversial foreign actors.
Funding and influence channels add another layer. A fund soliciting monthly gifts calls to “support the struggle to dismantle U.S. empire,” and internal plans discuss bringing “endorsed electeds” along to cultivate pro-Cuba solidarity among rising politicians. That plan aims to build a “pro-Cuba block basically of elected officials” and to place sympathetic lawmakers at federal levels, a strategy for expanding foreign-aligned influence into domestic political structures.
China also appears on the DSA’s international radar. Meeting notes from an internal China working group show activists discussing ways “to interface with the DSA” and even to “develop a killer two-week itinerary” to build connections with the CPC. Comments in earlier minutes downplayed Uyghur abuses as “not a genocide or Holocaust,” a characterization at odds with established reporting about mass detention in Xinjiang.
High-profile left-wing commentators and candidates have appeared alongside or on DSA platforms, blurring lines between formal membership and political association. Prominent streamers and past candidates have headlined chapter events and fundraiser stages, and some candidates described as friends of the group say they are “not technically or practically DSA.” Whether formal dues are paid matters less than the public alignment and shared platforms.
The State Department noted the DSA’s eagerness to embrace certain foreign ideas, stating the group “freely embraced the policy agenda and worldview of its own accord” while also warning that “the group has no ties to the Cuban regime and its influence network” would be an incomplete reading. The report observed that Havana’s influence efforts have evolved, meaning outside regimes may not need covert channels when sympathetic domestic actors volunteer their support.
This is a political organization that mixes electoral work with factions openly celebrating communist traditions, traveling to adversary capitals, and adopting aggressive language about overthrowing constitutional order. These elements present a challenge for any mainstream party that shares ballots with such a group while debating how to respond to its rhetoric, associations, and internal strategies.
